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Abstract
Distributed Hash Table-based overlays are widely used to support eﬃcient information routing and storage in structured peer-
to-peer networks, but they are also subject to numerous attacks aimed at disrupting their correct functioning. In this paper we
analyze the impact of the Eclipse attack on a Chord-based overlay in terms of number of key lookups intercepted by a collusion
of malicious nodes. Moreover, we propose some modiﬁcations to the Chord routing protocol in order to mitigate its eﬀects. Such
countermeasures can operate in a distributed fashion or assume the presence of a centralized trusted entity and introduce a limited
traﬃc overhead. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed mitigation techniques has been shown through numerical results.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Self-organizing Distributed Hash Table-based (DHT) overlays such as Chord1 enable scalable information routing
in peer-to-peer (P2P) distributed networks, supporting a wide range of applications, from content distribution and ﬁle-
sharing to decentralized network services. Unfortunately, given the relative ease for a node in obtaining a membership
to the overlays, such networks are prone to a variety of attacks which can be performed by a collusion of malicious
nodes controlled by a single adversary, aimed at altering the routing and/or the content of the messages. Among those,
Sybil2 and Eclipse3 have received particular attention by the research community, due to their disruptive eﬀects.
The Sybil attack exploits the fact that the nodes joining the network are not required to provide any reputation
guarantees and the security checks on their identities are usually very loose or even absent. Therefore, a single
physical entity can easily obtain multiple logical identities and thus create a set of colluded nodes which control a
considerable fraction of the keys stored in the network. Though the Sybil attack is not speciﬁc to DHTs, it has been
widely investigated in the last decade, since it can be used to subvert the protocol and by mounting other categories
of security attacks, including the Eclipse attack. In this attack, the collusion of corrupted nodes perform routing table
poisoning by providing to their neighbors only malicious references. If most of the entries in the routing table of an
honest node are malicious, then almost all the communication ﬂows originating from that node can be intercepted by
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the collusion of dishonest nodes, thus “eclipsing” the rest of the network. The Eclipse attack can be in turn exploited
to amplify the eﬀect of other attacks, e.g. routing and storage attacks3.
Numerous countermeasures to mitigate the eﬀect of such attacks have been proposed in the recent literature (see
Urdaneta et al.4 for an overview), but most of them have the drawback of limiting the scalability of the system or of
introducing centralized certiﬁcation/authentication mechanisms, thus distorting the intrinsically distributed nature of
P2P networks.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of Eclipse on a Chord- based DHT overlay and propose two mitigation
techniques to limit its eﬀects and ensure the correct functioning of the under-attack overlay, though with reduced
performance. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview about cyber-attacks
to P2P overlays, while Section 3 recalls basic notions about the Chord protocol. A detailed description of the Eclipse
attacker model in Chord overlays is provided in Section 4. Our proposed countermeasures are discussed in Section 5
and their eﬀectiveness is evaluated in Section 6 through numerical results. The paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Related Work
Various methods to counteract the eﬀects of the Sybil and Eclipse attacks to DHT based overlays have been pro-
posed in the recent literature: for a comprehensive overview, the reader is referred to Urdaneta et al.4. For what
concerns the Sybil attack, Castro et al.5 propose to secure the assignment of the node identiﬁers by relying on central-
ized certiﬁcation authorities, which ensure that the node IDs are randomly assigned with uniform distribution on the
ID space and bounded to the IP address of the nodes. This prevents an attacker from impersonating multiple identities
strategically placed along the ring, in order to gain control on a wide fraction of the network, and avoids ID swapping
among the malicious nodes. The drawback of this solution is that it limits the scalability of the system. Therefore, the
authors propose an alternative distributed technique aimed at limiting the rate at which the identiﬁers can be obtained
by the nodes joining the Chord ring: in order to obtain an identiﬁer, the node must solve a computationally demanding
crypto-puzzle. Variations on the crypto-puzzle approach were investigated by Borisov et al.6 and Rowaihy et al.7.
A distributed registration procedure has been proposed by Dinger et al.8, which relies on registration nodes that
list the node IDs associated to the same IP address and reject new joins if it the number of IDs per IP address exceeds
a threshold. The authors also propose some metrics to quantify the impact of the Sybil attack. Other countermeasures
rely on network coordinates (such as the hop-count distance), as proposed by Bazzi et al.9, or on social information
obtained through social networks, as discussed by Danezis et al.10 and Yu et al.11 to individuate and exclude malicious
nodes. Our proposed mitigation techniques rely on the assumption that the Chord IDs are randomly assigned, though
assuming that a single attacker can control a collusion of multiple malicious nodes.
Among the possible defenses against the Eclipse attack, Castro et al.5 suggest to combine the countermeasures to
the Sybil attack with replicating the keys on multiple nodes, thus adding redundancy to the system and allowing the
usage of multiple routes to reach the key requested with the query routine, as well as routing failure tests to identify
which routes have been altered by malicious nodes. The usage of redundant routing tables has been proposed also by
Awerbuch et al.12 and associated to periodic churn induction by Hildrum et al.13. However, this approach introduces a
signiﬁcant communication overhead: our proposed countermeasures do not require any additional message exchange
or introduce a limited message overhead. Singh et al.14 propose the combination of distributed anonymous auditing of
the connectivity of the neighbouring nodes with a degree bounding mechanism, in order to individuate nodes having
excessively high in-degree and to remove them from the routing tables. We also propose a distributed method to
identify and remove polluted entries from the nodes’ successor lists.
3. Background on the Chord Protocol
The Chord protocol provides eﬃcient location of data items in a distributed network by identifying the items
through a key and assigning the keys to one of the nodes using consistent hashing. More in detail, each node and key
is associated to an m-bit identiﬁer through a hash function such as SHA-1, which takes as input the node’s IP address
and the key itself, respectively. The identiﬁers are ordered along a circle of numbers modulo 2m and the k-th key is
assigned to the ﬁrst node whose identiﬁer is equal or follows the identiﬁer of k along the circle. Such node is referred
to as the successor node of key k. Every time a new node n joins the network, some of the keys previously assigned
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Algorithm 1 n.ﬁnd successor(ID)
1: if ID ∈ (n, successor] then
2: return successor
3: else
4: n′ = closest preceeding node(ID)
5: end if
6: return n′. f ind successor(ID)
Algorithm 2 n.closest preceding node(ID)
1: for i = m downto 1 do
2: if f inger[i] ∈ (n, ID) then
3: return f inger[i]
4: end if
5: end for
6: return n
to n’s successor are reassigned to n, according to the values of their identiﬁers. Conversely, when a node leaves the
network, all its keys are reassigned to its successor.
The key lookup procedure can be implemented in a distributed fashion by relying on a routing table named ﬁnger
table and maintained by each node n, where the i-th entry contains the identiﬁer of the successor of n + 2i−1. A node
looking for key k consults its ﬁnger table and contacts the node whose identiﬁer most closely precedes the identiﬁer
of k by means of Algorithms 1 and 2, deﬁned in1. In turn, the targeted node repeats the same operation, thus creating
a recursive mechanism, until the node responsible for the key k is reached. Paper1 proves that the lookup procedure
involves O(logN) nodes, where N is the total number of nodes of the Chord ring.
To increase robustness to node failures, each node also maintains a successor list, where it stores the identiﬁers
of its r nearest successors on the ring (where r is a system parameter): in case the node notices that its successor
has failed, it replaces the failed node with the ﬁrst live entry in the list. In the remainder of the paper, the set of
nodes whose identiﬁers are stored in the ﬁnger table and successor list of the n-th node will be referred to as the
neighborhood of node n. In order to ensure the correctness of the information contained in the ﬁnger tables and
successor lists, Chord supports stabilization and ﬁx ﬁnger procedures, which periodically update the entries adapting
to the actual joining nodes and network structure. For further details, the reader is referred to1.
4. Attacker Model
We consider two attack scenarios: the Sybil and the Eclipse attacks. In both cases, we assume that the attacker
controls a fraction f of the network peer nodes and communicates out-of-band with all of the colluded nodes, possibly
providing them with auxiliary information. Moreover, we assume that Chord IDs are obtained from node network
addresses by using a cryptographically secure hash function, therefore the attacker has no control on the choice of
the Chord IDs assigned to the corrupted nodes. Further, the Chord IDs of the malicious nodes can be assumed to be
uniformly distributed along the ID space. Finally, we assume that a malicious nodes cannot send messages with a
spoofed source address, (and thus with a forged Chord ID).
In the Sybil attack, the malicious nodes follow the honest-but-curious behavioral model, i.e. they honestly execute
the protocol but they keep all the information they obtain by participating to the Chord query and routing procedures.
Diﬀerently, in the Eclipse attack the malicious nodes behave according to a dishonest model, i.e. they do not
always adhere to the protocol speciﬁcations but introduce modiﬁcations in the execution of the protocol routines. In
particular, the find successor(x) algorithm always returns the ID of the ﬁrst malicious node following ID x in the
Chord ring. What the malicious node does when it receives a query to obtain the data item associated to ID x, depends
on the application and on the speciﬁc attack: the malicious node could for example ignore the query request or provide
altered data. Since our mitigation techniques are agnostic with respect to the speciﬁcations of the application layer,
we do not make any assumption regarding the behavioral model of the attacker during the data retrieval phase. In the
rest of the paper, the probability that a query is captured by a malicious node will be considered a key indicator of the
eﬀectiveness of the attack or of the countermeasure.
5. Countermeasures
In this section we propose two countermeasures to mitigate the eﬀects of the Eclipse attack. Such countermeasures
operate in two diﬀerent phases of the Chord protocol, namely the construction procedure of the nodes’ ﬁnger table
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Algorithm 3 n.modiﬁed ﬁnd successor(ID)
1: if ID ∈ (n, successor] then
2: return successor
3: else
4: n′ = successor list.closest preceeding node(ID) // successor list lookup
5: if f inger table.closest preceeding node(ID) ∈ (n′, ID) then
6: n′ = f inger table.closest preceeding node(ID) // ﬁnger table lookup
7: end if
8: if auxiliary table.closest preceeding node(ID) ∈ (n′, ID) then
9: n′ = auxiliary table.closest preceeding node(ID) // auxiliary table lookup
10: end if
11: end if
12: return n′. f ind successor(ID)
and successor list and the message forwarding during the key lookup routine. Both techniques are aimed at improving
the knowledge of the honest nodes about the network topology according to the following approaches: i) building
an auxiliary local list of node identiﬁers which can integrate the node’s ﬁnger table and successor list; ii) purging
the node’s successor list form the entries sent by the malicious nodes, in order to isolate them during the execution
of the protocol. Moreover, our proposed techniques can be categorized as follows: i) countermeasures which do not
require any modiﬁcation of the standard Chord protocol; ii) countermeasures which modify the standard protocol by
introducing additional information exchanges.
5.1. Auxiliary Node List
The basic idea is to provide to each honest node an auxiliary list of IDs of other peers, which can be used to integrate
both the local ﬁnger table and successor list, as shown in Algorithm 3. The Algorithm works assuming that the IDs
in the auxiliary list are stored in ascending order and implements the successor list lookup (line 4) and the ﬁnger
table lookup (lines 5-7) as implemented within the OMNET++/OverSim framework15,16. Moreover, the Algorithm
introduces the auxiliary node list lookup (lines 8-10). If at least a certain amount of entries of the auxiliary list are
IDs of honest nodes, the eﬀects of the routing pollution performed by the malicious nodes, which always provide
false routing information when contacted by the honest nodes during the ﬁnd successor process, can be limited. We
propose the following three approaches to generate the auxiliary node list.
Centralized approach. it assumes the presence of an external trusted node which has full knowledge of the network
topology and periodically communicates to each node w peers’ identiﬁers, obtained by random sampling of the whole
list of identiﬁers of the nodes currently joining the Chord ring. Neglecting the communication overhead due to the
notiﬁcations of joins and leaves to the external node, the size of a message containing the auxiliary list destined to
the peers is w · m. The drawback of this approach is that it requires a centralized infrastructure, which might limit the
scalability of the P2P network.
Distributed non interactive approach. the auxiliary table can be built relying exclusively on local information as
follows. Every honest node n independently stores in the auxiliary list the identiﬁer of the source node of each key
lookup message it receives. This solution has the advantage of not requiring any additional information exchange
among the nodes other than the standard Chord procedures.
Distributed interactive approach. periodically, the n-th honest node sends to each node belonging to its neighborhood
a neighborhood request message. If the contacted node is honest, it answers sending the list of identiﬁers of its own
neighbors, which node n uses to ﬁll its auxiliary table. Since a node neighborhood comprehends the ﬁnger table
entries (which are on average logN) and the r successor list entries, the average size of a neighborhood response
message can be computed as (logN + r) · m. Note that the neighbor request/response messages are not included in
the standard Chord protocol, thus the the corresponding routines must be deﬁned accordingly. The drawback of this
solution is that the neighborhood exchange among the nodes introduces an additional traﬃc overhead.
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(b) Dependence on the size of the auxiliary node list, w, assuming N = 1000.
Fig. 1: Percentage of captured keys, Kc, versus the fraction of malicious nodes, f
5.2. Elimination of Far Successors
Diﬀerently from the previous countermeasure, this technique is aimed at identifying and eliminating the malicious
entries contained in the local successor list, without introducing any communication overhead. It has been shown in17
that if the identiﬁers of the malicious nodes are uniformly distributed along the Chord ring, the distance (expressed
as the diﬀerence of two node IDs modulo m) between two consecutive malicious nodes can be modelled as a random
variable with geometric distribution and mean μ f = 2
m
f N , while the distance among any two consecutive nodes is a
random variable with geometric distribution and mean μ = 2
m
N ≤ μ f . Since the successor list of a malicious nodes
exclusively contains the identiﬁers of other malicious nodes, the distance among two consecutive entries of the list
is expected to be higher with respect to the case of honest nodes. The countermeasure operates as follows: every
honest node independently computes the distance between the i-th and (i+ 1)-th entry of the successor list (1 ≤ i < r).
If such distance exceeds h · μ, where h is a system parameter, the (i + 1)-th node is classiﬁed as malicious and the
corresponding entry is eliminated from the successor list. For a discussion about the tuning of h, the reader is referred
to Section 6.
6. Performance Assessment
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the Eclipse attack on the Chord protocol and the performance of our
proposed mitigation techniques. For this purpose, the attack and the countermeasures have been implemented within
the OMNET++/OverSim framework under the assumptions regarding the behavioral model of the malicious nodes
that a key lookup procedure is never initiated by a malicious node, and that malicious nodes ignore all the key lookup
messages they receive.
Figure 1a plots the trend of the percentage of captured keys, Kc, as a function of the fraction of colluded nodes,
f , for various values of the overall number of nodes, N. Results show that such percentage increases superlinearly
with f : even with a small fraction of malicious nodes, Kc is very high and closely approaches 100% in case of large
networks. Figure 1b shows the impact of the length of the auxiliary node list, w, on the eﬀectiveness of the Auxiliary
Node List defense: even if the number of entries of such tables is limited (e.g. w = N/50), Kc drops signifcantly,
especially for low f . For the Elimination of Far Successors countermeasure, the tuning of the parameter h has been
performed empirically, by evaluating Kc for diﬀerent values of N and h: numerical results (not reported for the sake
of conciseness) show that the eﬀectiveness of the countermeasure is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the value of h, which
can be chosen without need of a ﬁne grained tuning.
Finally, Figure 2 compares the percentage of captured keys in presence of the Eclipse attack in case no countermea-
sure is used to the values of Kc obtained by applying each of the three distributed mitigation techniques independently,
and then by combining all of them (the Auxiliary Node List centralized approach is considered as benchmark), for dif-
ferent values of N. The parameter h for the Elimination of Far Successors countermeasure has been set to h = 1.2,
while the size of the auxiliary node list has been set to w = N/50. Results show that the reduction of Kc obtained
through each single distributed countermeasure is mild, but combining all the distributed approaches leads to a con-
siderable decrease of the percentage of captured keys, which results to be only slightly above the performance of the
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Fig. 2: Percentage of captured keys, Kc, versus the number of nodes, N, for the proposed countermeasures, assuming
f = 0.03.
centralized approach. Therefore, we conclude that the distributed mitigation techniques provide comparable eﬀective-
ness with respect to the centralized approach, avoiding the introduction of scalability issues of the P2P overlay.
7. Conclusions
This paper discusses the impact of the Eclipse attack to Chord-based structured peer-to-peer overlays and proposes
a set of countermeasures to mitigate its eﬀects. Numerical results show the eﬀectiveness of the proposed mitigation
techniques. Future research activities will be devoted to the design of detection algorithms aimed at identifying a
possible ongoing attack, in order to trigger adequate defense mechamisms.
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